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Abstract 
Increasing budgetary constraints and the rapid growth of threats to global security have made 
the need for a new model of acquisition governance ever more obvious. In order to make 
better use of its defense dollars while contracting to acquire more advanced defense 
capabilities, the defense acquisition community in the United States needs to improve 
governance processes for complex acquisitions.  
Over the last decade, researchers at the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS) have studied and analyzed the increased challenges of complexity in defense 
acquisitions. Through workshops, conferences, and publications, CSIS has examined how 
the government purchases complex systems, what challenges it encounters in doing so, and 
what key attributes of governance can be modulated to provide more effective acquisition. 
The study underlying this report explored one simple question: In complex systems of 
systems, what best practices contribute to better, more efficient acquisitions? To answer this 
question, the CSIS project team reviewed its past work on complexity in acquisitions, 
analyzed new scholarship on the subject, and conducted detailed interviews with executives 
from across the defense acquisition community. This 12-month effort culminated with the 
production of a new model of acquisition governance model presented in this abridged 
version of a longer technical report on the research. 
The governance framework starts with eight attributes of program management, which CSIS 
developed under its past research on the subject. The study applied this framework to seven 
acquisition case examples of various sizes and complexity which have shown differing 
degrees of program success. CSIS also conducted 11 interviews with 17 acquisition 
executives and stakeholders covering each of the case examples to help identify success 
drivers and good governance themes. Finally, CSIS used the case studies and interviews to 
develop a model of acquisition governance that could help strengthen the ability of acquisition 
leaders to more effectively and efficiently acquire complex systems of systems (SoS). 
The research illustrates how best practices in the three most critical attributes—level of 
organizational focus, decision-making authority, and enforcement—can make the difference 
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between success and failure of an acquisition effort. Best practices in the remaining attributes 
also enable the efficient production and procurement of effective systems of systems and 
assist mission success in large, complex acquisitions. 
Readers should refer to the full report for supporting evidence in the form of case studies and 
interview summaries. 
Introduction 
Complexity: The Problem Defined 
As the defense needs of the nation’s warfighters have evolved, acquisition 
preferences within the Department of Defense (DoD) have also transformed in a way that 
pushes human capital, technical knowledge, and production assets away from the 
government and toward industry. However, existing models seem to fall short of providing 
an effective governance approach when faced with the evolving challenges of complexity. 
Within complexity theory, complex systems are defined as those systems in which 
multiple components interact with and exert influence on one another and the various 
factors in their external environments over time. This research focuses on complexity within 
SoS acquisition specifically. As a result, this paper uses complexity to describe systems 
consisting of multiple sub-systems and components that are typically developed and 
managed by more than one organizational element. The existing literature has applied the 
principles of complexity theory extensively to such fields as economics and business 
management. This research aims to contribute to the literature by identifying best practices 
specific to the challenges defense and federal-civil acquisition managers confront in their 
SoS acquisition efforts. This focus is narrow, but as with other work that has been 
undertaken on complexity, its implications are applicable to other disciplines. 
Complex systems present four related problems for defense acquisition planners and 
decision-makers. First, the conceptual size of a complex system is larger than a traditional 
system. For example, ground vehicles used in the early- to mid-20th century were treated as 
one product; their interactions with other materiel were not negligible, but those interactions 
could be managed on a tactical level post-deployment. Conversely, today’s ground vehicles 
contain their own sub-systems. A personnel carrier might have dozens of its own active and 
passive protection systems interacting with the vehicle and the external environment, a 
number of different communications devices, and various on-board weapons platforms, to 
name a few. Each of these systems has its own acquisition demands above and beyond the 
base requirements of the vehicle itself. 
Second, each of the sub-systems within a system, as well as the systems external to 
it, interacts with others. Some of those interactions can be forecast to some degree, but 
forecasts will have limited accuracy. Furthermore, interactions can produce cascading 
interactions and change the behavior of other sub-systems or the system as a whole. This 
contributes to a third problem presented by complexity, namely that the output of a system is 
not equal to the sum of its inputs. The interactions can create amplified or diminished 
outcomes. This is a driver of complexity in defense platforms, as the multiplying effects of 
complementary systems can create new and more advanced defense technologies. 
However, as with the interactions themselves, it is difficult to forecast the individual and 
aggregate results of the system and sub-system interactions, much less to harness them for 
a desired outcome. 
Finally, complexity is a management problem because it operates outside the 
boundaries of traditional linear approaches to acquisition governance. This is central to the 
objective of this report. Traditional, risk-averse governance approaches to designing, 
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engineering, developing, and procuring defense weapons and platforms are not adequately 
flexible to manage the unpredictable interactions of systems, sub-systems, and the external 
environment. They are based on static program objectives to acquire dynamic technologies. 
Those technologies then often evolve at widely different rates of development, and 
upgrading platforms with long life cycles can be difficult. 
Models of SoS Governance 
In order to understand the problem presented by complexity, it is important to have a 
framework with which to conceptualize complex acquisition. Broadly speaking, there are two 
ways to conceptualize efforts to acquire systems of systems: the traditional model and the 
enterprise model. 
In the traditional model of acquisition governance, a program office or a similar 
central authority mandates and governs the capabilities comprising a systems of systems. 
Linear acquisition activities follow defined user needs, typically in the form of broad tactical 
requirements. The acquisition activities begin with overarching technical requirements, 
which inform offers or bids from government and industry suppliers. Program offices analyze 
bids for their closeness-of-fit to certain criteria and select a winning solution. The winning 
contractor then develops, produces, and deploys the systems of systems (see Figure 1). 
 
 Traditional Acquisition Governance 
Note. This figure comes from CSIS analysis. “Acquisition Activities” was adapted from 
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Challenges pursuant to this model emerge from its linearity. The case studies identify 
three interrelated ways in which the linearity of the traditional model challenges the ability of 
the DoD to execute complex SoS efforts and to deliver capabilities on-cost and on-schedule. 
First, individual stages of the acquisition process have difficulty responding to changes in 
user needs and the external environment once these inputs have set the technical 
requirements. Second, efforts to preempt changes in those inputs often result in acquisitions 
of immature technologies with high levels of risk. Finally, as delays occur in the development 
of components of the systems, parent systems cannot adapt, which in turn can create 
setbacks. This effect can occur in any complex effort regardless of the model, but the 
structure of the traditional model of governance exaggerates this effect. 
In contrast with the traditional model, the enterprise model of acquisition governance 
breaks SoS acquisition into different layers of authority. This characteristic is a key 
difference between the enterprise model and the traditional model, which employs a top-
down unified approach to governance. The division of authority allows different stages of an 
SoS acquisition effort to influence one another in separate bilateral relationships. It also 
enables individual stages of acquisition to adapt to changes in the external environment. 
These characteristics comprise a more agile approach to acquisition (see Figure 2). 
 
 Enterprise Acquisition Governance 
Note. This figure comes from CSIS Analysis. 
As illustrated by Figure 1 in the previous section, the traditional model treats the 
external environment as its own unit. This allows environmental factors to inform user needs 
but makes it more difficult for them to influence other stages of the acquisition effort. For 
example, resource factors are critical to solutions analysis and selection; however, aside 
from the influence of resource factors in the initial stages of solutions analysis, top-down 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= - 98 - 
governance in the traditional model complicates real-time adjustment to changes in those 
factors.  
Analysis of these models indicates that layered authority is the key differentiator 
between the enterprise and traditional approaches to acquisition. However, CSIS case study 
analysis suggests that the acquisition community has been selective about how it divides 
authority, even in those efforts most representative of the enterprise model. This research 
uses the eight-attribute governance framework to observe how individual attributes relate to 
each case’s ability to manage complexity internally and externally. The cases show that the 
ability to manage complexity directly correlates with the degree to which the responsible 
stakeholders have independent authority in each attribute for which they are accountable. 
The seven cases included in this study include two cases with more traditional 
governance models and five with governance models that were closer to the enterprise 
model. Here are the seven cases. 
Traditional Governance Cases: 
1. Future Combat System (FCS) 
2. Integrated Deepwater System (Deepwater) 
Enterprise-Wide Governance Cases: 
3. Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar (C-RAM) 
4. Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) 
5. Global Nuclear Detection System (GNDS) 
6. Harvest Hawk 
7. Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) 
Attributes of SoS Governance 
CSIS developed its framework for analysis of governance in complex acquisitions to 
help understand the drivers of success in SoS acquisition. The framework is the product of 
research on SoS governance models, interviews with program stakeholders and industry 
leaders, and a findings refinement process involving input from SoS experts. It consists of 
eight attributes that collectively represent concerns, questions, and issues that must be 
addressed for an organization to succeed in acquiring a complex systems of systems. The 
importance and significance of these attributes varies depending on the system to which the 
framework is being applied. 
The eight governance attributes are as follows: 
 Level of organizational focus: the level at which SoS governance occurs 
within the organization. This is not the same as systems/capabilities focus or 
technical focus, both of which are outside the scope of the CSIS SoS 
governance analysis. 
 Integration of functional end-user needs: the mechanisms and frequency with 
which the functional needs of end-users are built into the systems of systems 
and at which points in the process this incorporation occurs. 
 Decision-making authority: the governance mechanisms for SoS delivery, 
including how budget is allocated, standards set, tradeoffs managed, and 
inconsistencies adjudicated.  
 Enforcement: the mechanisms and level of oversight by which the objectives 
of the SoS capability to be delivered are ensured. 
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 Workforce: the examination of SoS workforce structures, unity of mission, 
and capability development through use of contracting.  
 Incentive structure: the alignment between the enterprise’s goals and the 
incentive and reward structures of the stakeholders and organizations that 
implement them.  
 Knowledge ownership/access to knowledge: the accessibility of information 
regarding the operating environment, technical standards, and the other parts 
of the systems of systems.  
 Risk assessment/risk management: risk assessments and management 
strategies tailored to the mission accomplishment and the flexibility and 
resilience required for delivering systems of systems in the face of 
unforeseen developments. 
This research examined seven case studies to profile their characteristics in each of 
these attribute areas. It then conducted interviews with acquisition executives and other 
program stakeholders to understand which attributes were most important in producing the 
successes of each effort, as well as those areas in which each effort did not perform 
optimally. A detailed analysis of each case study is available in the full report associated 
with this proceedings paper. 
Results of CSIS Interviews With SoS Program Stakeholders 
Case studies on seven example SoS acquisition efforts comprised the core of this 
CSIS research effort. These case studies facilitated analysis of the specific governance 
attributes for each case and provided important qualitative gauges on their importance. The 
results of these interviews suggest that an agile and multi-layered governance process can 
lessen the operational burden of managing and delivering complex systems of systems. 
Furthermore, strong enforcement mechanisms are necessary to ensure outcomes are in line 
with expectations. 
The CSIS research team conducted 11 interviews in total with the participation of 17 
acquisition executives. Each interview lasted about 1–2 hours and was semi-structured to 
allow interviewees to stray from the explicit governance attributes and provide more general 
commentary on acquisition challenges.  
The interviews suggested that five themes are critical to understanding governance 
of complex acquisition. These themes are presented here in order of importance to 
governance.  
Theme #1: Stakeholders must maintain focus on the end-result of an 
acquisition effort at the enterprise level.  
First, complex acquisition governance requires that all stakeholders maintain focus 
on the end-result at the enterprise level. This structural issue is central to a system’s ability 
to operate in an environment consisting of multiple other systems. Interviewees suggest that 
a narrow focus—focus on a specific product or capability set, for example—compromises 
the value of a single system’s acquisition to the overall objectives of the systems of systems 
and its user communities. This narrow focus also contributes to demand uncertainty in 
instances where stakeholders simultaneously develop multiple competing capabilities to 
accomplish the same end goal. 
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One case that CSIS examined, Future Combat Systems (FCS), offers several 
insights about the impact of a product- or program-level focus on the success of an 
acquisition effort. A former DoD acquisition official involved in overseeing FCS said that 
many in the acquisition community charged with approving the program at its various 
decision milestones were concerned that FCS network components seemed to duplicate 
functions available with existing technologies. Furthermore, the source continues, FCS had 
no roadmap for integration with interacting systems, particularly the Warfighter Information 
Network-Tactical (WIN-T), an all-encompassing Army tactical network program, and Joint 
Network Node (JNN), a SatCom system. One interviewee criticized the program for 
attempting to build its own operating systems from scratch rather than use existing operating 
systems able to interface with WIN-T and JNN. The engineers had no plan for bringing 
those pieces together, and testing their interactions required that the entire system first be 
fielded, the interviewee reports. 
Interviews with several program executives and stakeholders emphasized the 
importance of enterprise-level focus. In cases such as FCS where focus is narrow, problems 
emerge where the feasibility of end-state integration is unclear. Integration problems also 
surface in cases where enterprise-focus is present, however. For example, in another CSIS 
case study, Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), acquisition executives maintained a focus 
on the objectives of the entire enterprise but were presented with challenges to enterprise-
wide integration all the same.  
Theme #2: A layered decision-making structure with distinct, delegated 
authority must be clearly established at the outset of complex acquisition efforts. 
The reason for integration problems, even in those programs in which organizational 
focus is held at the enterprise level, underscores a second theme about complex acquisition 
governance. It suggests that a layered decision-making structure with distinct, delegated 
authority must be clearly established at the outset of complex acquisition efforts in order for 
their level of organizational focus to matter.  
Interview results show that the various process constraints faced by each of the 
acquisition case studies—for example, clarity and consistency of scope, availability of 
personnel, inventory of resources, and so forth—are due in part to their decision-making 
structures. Process constraints also translate to poor outcomes in cases where decision-
making structures were not designed to meet the specific needs of an acquisition effort, or 
where decision-making authority was weak or non-existent. 
The MDA effort demonstrates the challenges created by weak and heavily 
centralized decision-making authority. In that case, interviewees report that the Executive 
Agent for MDA (EAMDA) has notional leadership over stakeholder agencies but no real 
decision-making authority. Instead, it serves in the role of what one interviewee calls a 
“broker and a cheerleader.” Formally, EAMDA issued an Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) 
to allow material solutions development under the standard defense acquisition process. 
However, there is no formal lead for requirements generation or subsequent acquisition 
decisions. As a result, stakeholder agencies have different perceptions of the MDA charter 
and what technologies satisfy its core mission objectives. These definitional issues emerge 
in the absence of strong central leadership. Interviewees support this observation and report 
similar challenges in the Global Nuclear Detectiong System (GNDS) case study, which is 
also examined in the full technical report. 
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 Distributed Common Ground System Conceptual Governance Structure 
and Key Acquisition Processes 
Note. This figure comes from CSIS analysis. 
CSIS analysis of the Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) contrasted with 
the MDA case in important ways. The DCGS decision-making structure is relatively well-
suited to the mission objectives of that acquisition, particularly in its decentralization. One 
DCGS executive reports that DCGS decision-making is conceptually separated into 
recommendation and implementation functions. Figure 3 illustrates this concept in the 
DCGS organizational structure and the key acquisition processes. 
The DCGS Steering Board serves as a strong, central leadership entity to provide 
capabilities guidance and keep development and procurement efforts aligned with core 
mission requirements. The Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps each have their own 
lead entities for the implementation functions. Each of the service components refers to the 
ICD to draft Capabilities Production Documents (CPDs) for each of their respective systems. 
The DCGS Steering Board then reviews the new capabilities to determine their fit with the 
standards and specifications established in the ICD and governed by a central 
interoperability framework, the Defense Intelligence Information Enterprise (DI2E). Similar to 
MDA and GNDS, this workflow represents an agile approach to decision-making that 
empowers end-user communities with substantially different requirements to make their own 
procurement decisions. However, it is supplemented by strong, formalized central 
leadership. 
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Theme #3: Decision-makers must design effective management and 
enforcement mechanisms and integrate them into the acquisition process. 
Interviewees suggest that enforcement mechanisms are the critical component tying 
together the enterprise focus with product-level decision-making. In order to maintain short 
chains of authority between the technical communities in the production chain with the 
enterprise-level planners at the top, decision-makers must design effective management 
and enforcement mechanisms and integrate them into the acquisition process. Formalized 
program management mechanisms consisting of a well-defined set of performance criteria 
have the advantage of lessening the process burden of complex acquisition. With 
complementary incentives and metrics for monitoring performance, enhanced program 
management can also contribute to improved cost and schedule outcomes.  
The process advantages of effective program management are apparent in the 
DCGS case. The DCGS effort runs an overarching recommendations and review process 
through the DCGS Steering Board, but delegates acquisition implementation to individual 
end-user communities based on a common set of standards established in the DI2E 
Framework. At the systems level, the acquiring service can approach risk in technology 
acquisition on a case-by-case basis. The acquiring armed forces component can also 
design its contract or contracts based on the scale of a particular acquisition item, or 
whether the acquisition is developmental or non-developmental. At the enterprise level, the 
DCGS Steering Board has a mediation process through which it can deny efforts that it 
determines to be too risky or that do not contribute to the DCGS mission objectives.  
The effectiveness of the DCGS program management structure is particularly 
apparent when compared with the management systems used in other large complex 
acquisition cases, such as FCS and Integrated Deepwater System (Deepwater). In these 
cases, acquisition was directed through single, service-centric programs of record. An 
overarching rule-set was applied to all subordinate efforts. Sources interviewed suggest 
DCGS has avoided the process rigidity that plagued FCS and Deepwater in part because of 
its separation of top-down program recommendations and bottom-up program 
implementation. 
Theme #4: Program leadership must prevent vested interests and cost 
concerns from becoming barriers to knowledge ownership. 
Organizational focus at the enterprise level, driven by clearly delegated decision-
making authority and supported by effective enforcement mechanisms, creates the 
necessary underpinnings of a complex governance structure. However, any one of these 
structural elements can be compromised when stakeholders are unable or unwilling to share 
information. This points at a fourth theme in complex acquisition governance: In order to 
execute a complex acquisition effort effectively and efficiently, agencies and offices 
partnered in the technical development of systems as well as the duties of program 
management must be able to access and share information among themselves. Oftentimes, 
barriers to knowledge access can inhibit the success of a complex project. Conversations 
with interviewees suggest that knowledge access also depends on strong incentives for 
active sharing of information about technologies, program goals, and progress toward 
established milestones. 
Interviewees indicate that there are two types of barriers to effective information 
sharing and knowledge access. The first barrier is knowledge protectionism. Especially in 
instances of collaboration between private sector stakeholders, conversations with 
interviewees suggest that companies are more likely to withhold information from partner 
entities due to competition for other government contracts. This concern was especially 
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strong in early efforts to make the DCGS Integration Backbone (DIB) software package 
open-source. In an effort to facilitate software revisions to help meet the needs of individual 
end-user communities, the DCGS Steering Board and DI2E Integration Council were 
strongly supportive of revealing the DIB source code to the development community. 
However, according to one program source, the DIB parent developer resisted efforts to 
make the software open-source. In the end, DCGS customer offices were able to compel 
the contractor to share its knowledge.  
Program challenges resulted from early resistance to revealing the DIB software 
code. By compelling its primary software contractor to open its code for other users to 
access and develop, the DCGS program office demonstrated how a large organization can 
work to reduce the impact of knowledge protectionism. Using the code, DIB challenger 
MarkLogic successfully developed a version of the DIB based on Extensible Markup 
Language (XML, an open-standards software encoding format) to help meet the needs of a 
sub-segment of the broader end-user community, the U. S. Special Operations Command 
(USSOCOM), which had a need for a high-performance reconnected-ops DI2E. 
A second barrier to information sharing is created by differing levels of information 
management capabilities. Levels of technical astuteness can be widely different between 
government customers and industry suppliers. This problem is compounded by varied 
clearance privileges required for access to, and use of, compartmentalized information. 
Sources interviewed indicate this problem has complicated several systems-of-systems 
acquisitions. Interviewees suggest that information needs among stakeholders in MDA are 
challenged both by the breadth of information collected and the need to filter it to lower 
levels of clearance, especially unclassified civil users in the Coast Guard. For participants in 
the Hercules Airborne Weapons Kit effort—known more commonly as Harvest HAWK—data 
relevant to that program were only accessible through a single computer network, requiring 
physical ownership of the data for effective information sharing. Sources point to these 
barriers as real and addressable challenges to acquiring and integrating systems of 
systems. 
Theme #5: Leaders at each level of the systems of systems must be adaptable 
to changes that result from human behavior. 
A fifth and final theme of complex governance reported by interviewees observes 
that leaders at each level of the systems of systems must be adaptable to changes resulting 
from human behavior. This theme is applicable not just to the acquisition of complex 
systems of systems involving many components and stakeholders but also to other systems 
in the natural world. Human behavior is the ultimate uncertainty, and agility is critical to 
absorbing the impact of its changes.  
Within SoS acquisition efforts specifically, effective governance will recognize 
changes in the needs of a system’s end-users early and, based on that recognition, 
reevaluate the approaches to a planned acquisition. This feedback loop can be formalized 
through component-level proposals for new capabilities (MDA). It can also be more ad hoc, 
incorporating standards-based innovations developed by end-users into the completed 
systems of systems (DCGS). In either case, the traditional approach to acquisition appears 
to limit responsiveness to end-user needs.  
In general, effectiveness appears to share a strong correlation with cases that were 
initiated with a clear end-user in mind. For example, the Harvest HAWK acquisition was born 
out of the necessity to provide air support for Marines in Afghanistan. Marines deployed to 
train Afghan security forces developed an urgent need for air support when their training unit 
encountered persistent attacks from adversary forces. Information obtained from the 
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Marines provided an impetus for the Harvest HAWK acquisition effort, making this case 
particularly representative of the effective use of human information inputs to produce and 
procure capabilities specifically answering the needs of the end-user. 
An additional aspect of human input is the workforce that a systems-of-systems effort 
has at its disposal. A good technical and program management workforce can make the 
difference between an effort’s success and failure. Recruiting a truly great workforce can 
dramatically improve both the magnitude of a system’s success as well as the process 
required to develop and procure it. Harvest HAWK provides an example of the importance of 
skilled technical personnel supplemented by experienced program managers. One source 
indicated that Harvest HAWK’s success in delivering a complex capability in a small period 
of time is attributable in part to the ability of the program management to take advantage of 
the technical workforce available through Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR).  
Several other cases illustrate that a strong program management workforce is not as 
effective in delivering a system-of-systems capability when it has a weak technical workforce 
at its disposal. Sources suggested that workforce strength is not measured by technical 
skillsets alone. Rather, complex acquisition efforts benefit when their workforce is 
empowered to use its technical know-how to innovate new approaches to solving problems.  
Although technical astuteness tends to reside with human capital in engineering 
functions, program managers often mistake general capabilities needs with prescriptive 
technical requirements under the existing framework for acquisition. Sources interviewed 
suggest that there is structural resistance to bottom-up innovation of new approaches to 
meeting capabilities demands, but several cases included examples where changing both 
personnel and their empowerment led to breakthroughs on problems.  
Analysis of Best Practices 
CSIS independently assessed success factors in the attributes and supplemented 
analysis with primary input from sources interviewed. This analysis extracted the best 
practices presented here. This approach facilitated analysis by incorporating the existing 
literature on complex systems with the expertise of acquisition executives involved in 
individual or multiple cases. 
Critical Best Practices 
An assessment of the case studies shows that success in three attributes in 
particular is critical to SoS acquisition. Those attributes are level of organizational focus, 
decision-making authority, and enforcement. The attributes are closely related, and strong 
performance in any one is dependent upon performance in the other two. 
Organizational focus at the enterprise level is critical to enabling SoS integration and 
facilitating flexibility for quick and substantive response to changes in the external 
environment. Although critical, enterprise-level focus is limited when it is not supplemented 
with some program-level focus on individual capabilities. The DCGS case, for example, 
shows the value of allowing programs and sub-system acquisition efforts to govern 
themselves to a certain point.  
The key to differentiating these two levels of focus and ensuring that they interact 
with and respond to one another is in part related to the decision-making authority attribute. 
At the program level, stakeholders should be delegated the authority to make decisions 
about systems and technologies with a low burden of approval from the enterprise level. 
This is especially important in complex systems of systems. The organizational legwork a 
program has to perform in order to approve a new sub-system that has newly developed or 
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emerged as an end-user need can prevent the program from timely and effective integration 
of that technology or capability.  
One way to achieve the right level of agility in decision-making delegation is to 
establish open-source standards for new technologies and systems as a replacement for 
traditional, formal oversight mechanisms. In interviews with CSIS, several Coast Guard 
executives indicated that it is already implementing this best practice post-Deepwater to 
ensure interoperability among C4ISR systems across its fleet of surface vessels and aircraft. 
Interviews also indicate DCGS revealed its DCGS Integration Backbone (DIB) for open 
source use, allowing industry to create a new and specialized XML-based search engine in 
order to meet a very specific end-user need. Therefore, this best practice assists decision-
makers at the enterprise level by lessening their programmatic requirements, and empowers 
decision-makers at the program level, as well as end-users themselves, to reflect SoS 
ecosystem changes in their planned acquisition activities. 
The enforcement attribute links decision-making authority with level of organizational 
focus. Effective enforcement mechanisms enable enterprise governance authorities to keep 
program managers on-cost and on-schedule while easing the operational burdens 
associated with delivering large, complex systems of systems. Although statutory 
mechanisms for enforcement are established in the DoD’s standard acquisition process, 
case study analysis finds those mechanisms custom-tailored to the specific demands of the 
individual systems of systems to be most successful. For example, the DCGS effort created 
a central authority to review petitions for capabilities from an enterprise perspective, and 
reserves the right to deny a sub-system acquisition effort in the event that it is determined to 
be incompatible with the SoS objectives. This exists outside of the standard DoD acquisition 
enforcement mechanisms. Furthermore, the case of FCS illustrates how existing 
mechanisms can in fact be counterproductive and conceal underlying problems in a 
complex SoS acquisition effort.  
Enabling Best Practices 
In addition to the critical best practices, performance in the remaining attributes 
enables SoS acquisition efforts to reach end capabilities with fewer cost and schedule 
problems. These enabling best practices also contribute to greater alignment between a 
systems of systems and the needs of its end-users. Finally, best practices in the remaining 
attributes help to mitigate problems of technology obsolescence and help ease the tendency 
for innovation in modern defense platforms to lag behind commercial industry.  
Successful SoS acquisition efforts accomplish greater integration of functional end-
user needs in part through the encouragement of innovation at the sub-systems level. One 
best practice in this regard involves the establishment and publication of open standards for 
software and systems. The DCGS offers one example. In that case study, DCGS program 
management responded to a SOCOM need for high-performance reconnected ops DI2E by 
pressuring the DCGS prime contractor to release the DIB source kernel for open-source 
collaboration. Using the DIB package, MarkLogic, a supplier of enterprise database 
software, created an XML database. In the end, the software proved valuable to SOCOM, a 
specific end-user community with unique, niche requirements.  
In addition to revealing systems for open-source innovation, case study analysis also 
indicates that kit-based and modular approaches to materiel development can contribute to 
greater integration of end-user needs. The reverse of this is the more traditional platform-
based development. Harvest HAWK provides one example of this best practice. In that 
program, users found the original kit to be inconvenient because of its weapons release 
mechanism. Namely, in order to deploy missiles, the system had to first depressurize. The 
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installation of a derringer door into the kit corrected the issue, and was made possible by the 
fact that the kits are not permanently installed on the C-130J platforms. The roll-on/roll-off 
nature of the Harvest HAWK capability allows for refinements not requiring significant SoS-
level changes. In contrast with this best practice, systems acquired under a traditional model 
show a heavily diminished ability to integrate changing end-user needs. Future Combat 
Systems (FCS), for example, folded all capabilities into a slow-moving platform acquisition 
effort in a way that precluded changes to sub-systems based on new end-user needs.  
In either of the two best practices in user needs integration (i.e., open source 
standards and kit-based development), performance in knowledge ownership and access to 
knowledge is an important enabler. For this reason, case studies illustrate that open-source 
publication of standards and basic software is a best practice in the information access 
attribute. However, revealing the foundation for a systems of systems alone is not enough to 
enable stakeholders to develop and refresh sub-systems. This information is only 
meaningful insofar as leadership in any SoS acquisition effort recognizes that stakeholders 
across systems of systems vary widely in their ability to access, understand, and use 
information that is available to them.  
Systematic and institutional stovepipes are one obstacle to information ownership. 
Other, less tangible obstacles include lower technical expertise among information 
consumers, lack of sufficient resources to handle the financial and technical costs of 
information, and compatibility issues in the recipients’ systems with the format or type of 
information. Therefore, one best practice to facilitate knowledge ownership and access to 
information is to campaign for—or in the event that the provider of information is also the 
lead stakeholder for a systems of systems, to approve and make available—the budgetary 
and technical resources necessary for information management. 
Workforce best practices comprise a third enabling factor in SoS acquisition. 
Identifying, recruiting, and retaining the most appropriate personnel for any SoS acquisition 
effort can substantially impact the effort’s process and outcomes. However, identifying best 
practices in this attribute is particularly difficult for two reasons. First, human inputs are 
unpredictable. In the case of Harvest HAWK, replacing a single engineer rescued the 
program from a months-long logjam when the new engineer identified an error in a sub-
system’s code that had been inhibiting the proper function of the systems of systems. 
Second, workforce is a complex system in itself; technical and programmatic personnel 
interact with one another at different levels with unpredictable impacts.  
Analysis of the case studies indicates that one best practice in the workforce attribute 
is to balance programmatic and technical personnel based on the specific needs of a 
program. At the enterprise level, the ideal workforce is weighted toward programmatic 
workers with some technical personnel available to provide overarching direction. At the 
systems level, technical personnel are more prevalent in the ideal workforce. Weighting 
toward technical personnel rather than programmatic personnel allows the workforce to 
avoid parochial interests and provide metrics-based assessments of progress toward a sub-
system’s development.  
Incorporating recent and one-time end-users into the workforce is an additional best 
practice that enhances the alignment of outputs with the need they are expected to satisfy. 
The Deepwater family of vessels has been incorporating this best practice into its efforts to 
acquire the vessels formerly comprising that systems of systems. The presence of decision-
makers with recent field experience in the Harvest HAWK initiative also contributed to that 
program’s success in producing an effective systems of systems to meet an urgent 
operational need on the part of the Marine Corps for close air support. 
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Regarding the incentive structure of an acquisition effort, analysis indicates fostering 
and satisfying greater mission commitment among stakeholders is an ideal motivator. 
Although mission commitment seems intangible and difficult to effect, the case studies 
highlight different ways to enhance the commitment of personnel throughout an acquisition 
effort’s hierarchy to the effort’s values and desired end-state. For example, having strong 
budgetary advocates at the executive level communicates to stakeholders that their work in 
the acquisition of a systems of systems is valuable to the end-user and to the organization 
as a whole. Analysis indicates that personnel management tools can provide additional 
incentives. For example, as shown in the Deepwater case, the strategic appointment of 
accomplished personnel to leadership positions can inspire confidence throughout a 
program. Similarly, accountability at each level of the personnel hierarchy provides a 
disincentive to poor performance. 
Case study analysis also illustrates that acquisition managers can influence an 
effort’s success through incentives aimed at other systems and organizations. Most notably, 
high barriers to the entry of new technologies into an acquisition effort act as a disincentive 
to mid-stream innovation and damage the long-term effectiveness of a systems of systems. 
The Harvest HAWK case offers several examples of barriers to entry and their impact on an 
effort’s process and outcomes. At the front end, the Marine Corps did not conduct a 
competition for source selection on the Harvest HAWK contract. Challenges that emerged 
later in the development process may have surfaced sooner if competitive offerings had 
been evaluated. In contrast with this situation, lower barriers to entry of competitive and 
more recent technologies in DCGS facilitated the emergence of a competitive database 
solution that ultimately improved the operability of the entire systems of systems.  
These best practices above represent ways to structure a complex acquisition effort 
to improve effectiveness and efficiency based on seven of the eight attributes analyzed. 
Identifying best practices in risk assessment, the final attribute, presents two significant 
challenges. First, risk is an inherent and unavoidable aspect of complexity. In addition to 
uncertainties originating in the development and procurement of individual systems, the 
interactions between and among those systems also creates potential areas of risk. Second, 
risks emerge in different stages of any given project in ways that cannot be predicted, 
complicating the universal application of best practices. For example, the Army’s approach 
to FCS exhibited greater risks in the early stages of system development. The effort was 
particularly risky in its requirements generation processes, which led to the selection of 
immature and untested technologies. Conversely, Harvest HAWK was non-developmental 
by default, and requirements in the early stages of that acquisition were less risky. It would 
appear that Harvest HAWK has adopted this as a best practice to reduce and manage risk. 
In fact, risks were just displaced elsewhere. They emerged when the Marine Corps began 
piecing existing systems together and creating new interactions for which the sub-systems 
had not been designed. 
Difficulties aside, analysis indicates best practices for the management and 
assessment of risk exist, but they should be evaluated for their fit with the specific objectives 
and challenges of an SoS acquisition effort and its unique sub-systems and interactions.  
A New Model of Systems-of-Systems Acquisitions 
By combining the results of its case study analysis with the themes gathered through 
the primary research interviews, CSIS developed the acquisition model presented in Table 
1. This model reflects the best practices described earlier in this report. 
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 Best Practices in Systems-of-Systems Acquisition 
Governance Attributes Program Characteristics
Level of organizational 
focus 
 Program-level focus supplemented by overarching enterprise-level 
governance and short authority chains 
Decision-making authority 
 Stakeholders are given relative autonomy to make systems-level 
decisions based on standards and common operating environments 
installed at the enterprise level 
 A central governance oversight body holds auditing and enforcement 
powers in order to maintain commitment to systems-of-systems core 
objectives 
Enforcement 
 Enterprise-level authorities maintain ability to review and revise gate 
decisions as sub-systems evolve and needs change 
 Clear, systems-specific reporting requirements are established based on 
technological maturity and projected development schedules to support 
enforcement authority 
Integration of functional 
end-user needs 
 Kit-based, modular systems allow timely integration of end-user needs 
and changes in the external environment 
 End-users are encouraged and empowered to develop their own sub-
systems solutions in compliance with established SoS standards 
Workforce 
 Systems-level technical workforce includes recent or one-time end-users 
in order to create greater symmetry between end capability and 
changing user needs 
 SoS-level technical workforce is small and agile to avoid parochial 
interests 
 Lean but dedicated programmatic workforce to create and support 
technical expertise 
Incentive structure 
 Uses budgetary and personnel levers to foster mission commitment and 
compliance with established standards 
 Low barriers to the entry of new technologies and the innovation of 
existing solutions 
Knowledge ownership/ 
access to knowledge 
 Leadership shows sensitivity to the wide range of information-handling 
capacity and ability of different stakeholders throughout an organization 
to manage and understand information 
 Leadership also campaigns to accommodate those stakeholder entities 
with lower information-handling capacity and ensure their interests are 
also incorporated into the information feedback loop 
 Standards and network backbones are freely shared amongst 
stakeholders to encourage user-level innovation and collaboration 
Risk assessment/risk 
management 
 Critical technologies are highly mature and commercial off-the-shelf 
(COTS) where possible 
 Clear, measurable metrics are established to monitor less mature 
technologies and changes in the external environment 
Concluding Thoughts and Topics for Further Research 
The research and analysis presented in this abridged version and explored in the 
associated CSIS technical report represent an important contribution to DoD efforts to 
improve its performance in delivering large, capable defense systems. This is a critical need 
for the nation’s defense planners and acquisition leaders. Downward budget pressure is 
likely to continue into the foreseeable future, and the threats are becoming more complex 
due to the increasing pace of global technological change and democratization of the means 
to inflict harm. Both of these pressures demand more robust governance for SoS 
acquisition. 
Additional research is necessary to refine the proposed governance model, test its 
theoretical impact on acquisition efforts through desktop systems modeling and simulation 
exercises, and observe its applicability to other challenges related to complexity. 
Subsequent research might attempt to answer the following pressing topics: 
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 Can exceptional performance in enabling attributes make up for poor 
performance in the three critical attributes? 
 What human capital planning helps ensure success in the three critical 
attributes, especially decision-making authority? 
 How can the governance framework be applied to other complex problems, 
such as battlefield command and corporate governance? 
 What quantitative modeling methods can be used to predict attribute 
shortfalls and simulate acquisition success and failure scenarios? 
These topics represent only a few areas of interest for further research. Additional research 
would apply successes in complexity research from other disciplines to the challenge of 
mapping complex acquisition efforts and forecasting mission success. 
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